On October 23rd, 2011, Jordan Robertson reported for the AP on how cyberattacks are quickly transitioning from the digital to the physical realm.  Using Stuxnet as an example, Robertson highlighted how the ability to hack computer systems and damage physical property is not exclusively in the possession of nation-states; worms similar to Stuxnet can be replicated by hackers with little money, time, or specialized skill.  This threat again highlights the danger that critical infrastructure like power plants and water systems face from determined hackers; the US Department of Homeland Security reveled that it has already responded to triple the number of computer attacks on critical infrastructure as compared to last year.   

Hackers were previously only able to dream about controlling the physical realm.  However, new findings as to how to take remote control of industrial "controller" boxes, the nerve centers for heavy machinery, has provided that physical control.   Controller boxes take computer commands and send instructions to physical machinery, such as regulating how fast a conveyor belt moves.  These devices are manufactured to last for decades, so there is little to no incentive to replace or update them.  It is the manipulation of these controller boxes that puts critical infrastructure at risk.  Moreover, the threat isn't limited to power plants.  The article points out how a hacker could manipulate a controller box to open cell doors, tamper with video feeds, and open the facility doors at prisons.  

In order to combat this threat, the article notes that organizations have to bridge cultural divides between physical and computer security.  In essence, the days of separating the two are coming to an end.  Organizations should also isolate critical control systems from the Internet to prevent such attacks.  Whatever the case, organizations are currently unprepared:  it took security researcher Dillon Beresford just two months and $20,000 in equipment to take remote control of electronic controllers commonly used by US companies.  Joe Weiss, an industrial control systems expert, noted that "What all this is saying is you don't have to be a nation-state to do this stuff. That's very scary."

The source article can be found here.

On October 23rd, 2011, Jordan Robertson reported for the AP on how cyberattacks are quickly transitioning from the digital to the physical realm.  Using Stuxnet as an example, Robertson highlighted how the ability to hack computer systems and damage physical property is not exclusively in the possession of nation-states; worms similar to Stuxnet can be replicated by hackers with little money, time, or specialized skill.  This threat again highlights the danger that critical infrastructure like power plants and water systems face from determined hackers; the US Department of Homeland Security reveled that it has already responded to triple the number of computer attacks on critical infrastructure as compared to last year.   

Hackers were previously only able to dream about controlling the physical realm.  However, new findings as to how to take remote control of industrial "controller" boxes, the nerve centers for heavy machinery, has provided that physical control.   Controller boxes take computer commands and send instructions to physical machinery, such as regulating how fast a conveyor belt moves.  These devices are manufactured to last for decades, so there is little to no incentive to replace or update them.  It is the manipulation of these controller boxes that puts critical infrastructure at risk.  Moreover, the threat isn't limited to power plants.  The article points out how a hacker could manipulate a controller box to open cell doors, tamper with video feeds, and open the facility doors at prisons.  

In order to combat this threat, the article notes that organizations have to bridge cultural divides between physical and computer security.  In essence, the days of separating the two are coming to an end.  Organizations should also isolate critical control systems from the Internet to prevent such attacks.  Whatever the case, organizations are currently unprepared:  it took security researcher Dillon Beresford just two months and $20,000 in equipment to take remote control of electronic controllers commonly used by US companies.  Joe Weiss, an industrial control systems expert, noted that "What all this is saying is you don't have to be a nation-state to do this stuff. That's very scary."

The source article can be found here.